Del 4 Kontraktsrett Tre hovedproblemstillinger Kontraktsrettsreglenes virkninger Hvilke regler bør gjelde for å nå ønskede mål Begrunnelser (og evt. forklaringer) på kontraktsrettsregler Hovedspørsmål: Bidrar eksisterende eller alternative regler til Pareto-effektivitet og ønsket fordeling? Regler som insitamenter To typer av analyseverktøy Spillteori for studier av forholdet mellom to parter Markedsteori (fullkommen konkurranse) for studier av hele markeder ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Kapitlenes hovedinnhold Kap 11 Hovedspørsmål og overordnet kontraktsrettsteori Kontraktsretten bidrar til oppfyllelse av FK-forutsetningene Kontraktsretten gir insitamenter til effektivitet Kap 12 Avtalevilkår i et marked Frivillig utforming av sekundære avtalevilkår i et marked Virkninger av deklaratoriske og preseptoriske regler for slike plikter Kap 13 Erstatningsvernet ved kontraktsbrudd Frivillig valg av avtale om erstatningsplikt Partene ønsker i egeninteresse å pålegge seg selv sanksjoner Kap 14 Deklaratorisk kontraktsrett og annen utfylling Betydningen av majoritetssynspunktet og tyngende bakgrunnsrett Mangelsansvaret analysert v.hj.a. modell for fullkommen konk. Teorien anvendt på videospillerdommen ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________

Kap 11 Hovedspørsmål og overordnet kontraktsrettsreori 11.1 De tre problemtyper 11.2 Virkninger av kontraktsrettsregler 11.2.1 Analyseverktøy Forutsetning i RØ: Rasjonelle aktører Forutsetning for kontraktsretten: Betjene aktører som antas å være i stand til å handle i overensstemmelse med egne interesser (=Rasjonelle aktører?) Spillteori passer for avtalesituasjonen med to eller få aktører (?), ellers markedsteori 11.2.2 Kontraktsrettsregler og effektivitet Kontraktsrettsregler fjerner hindringer for Pareto-forbedringer Kontraktsrettsregler reduserer transaksjonskostnader 11.3 Hvilke kontraktsvilkår og kontraktsrettsregler bør vi ha? To viktige spørsmål i kontraktsretten: Hvilke løfter bør håndheves? Hvilke sanksjoner bør vi ha for kontraktsbrudd? Svarene avhenger av målsetning: Effektive avtaler Hvilke løfter bør håndheves for at resultatet skal bli effektivt? Hvilke sanksjoner bør vi ha for at resultatet skal bli effektivt? Effektivitet som harmoniserende moment i kontraktsretten 11.4 Forklaring av rettsregler ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

11.5 Markedsanalyser uten kontraktsbrudd En ideell (eller perfekt) kontrakt er en kontrakt som partene ville ha inngått hvis det ikke hadde vært for transaksjonskostnader En ideell kontrakt er Pareto-effektiv Frikonkurransemodellens likevektsløsning består av ideelle kontrakter. (Her er det forutsatt at det ikke foreligger transaksjonskostander) Tema i RØ: Bidrar kontraktsrettsregler til at den ideelle kontrakt blir realisert? Hvordan bør kontraktsretten være for å realisere den ideelle kontrakt? Kan kontraktsretten begrunnes og forklares som et resultat av et ønske om å realisere den ideelle kontrakt? Korrespondanser mellom FK-modellen (med ideell kontrakt) og kontraktsretten __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

11.6 Spillteoretisk analyse av erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen Mulige grunner til at normen ”avtaler skal holdes” blir etterlevet: Dom for erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen, annen erstatning, naturaloppfyllelse Skyld, skam, hensyn til fremtidig forretningsvirksomhet 11.6.1 Forhandlingsspill uten kontrakt og uten norm om at ”avtaler skal holdes” Tilvirkningskontrakt Produksjonskostnader: 7 Kjøpers betalingsvillighet: 4 Samarbeidsoverskudd: 3 (1 til kjøper og 2 til selger) Selger: dominerende strategi (DS): Ikke samarbeid Kjøper: beste svar (ingen DS): Ikke forskutter __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

11.6 Spillteoretisk analyse av erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen (forts.) Virkning av normen ”avtaler skal holdes” med erstatningsplikt for brudd (positiv analyse) 11.6.1 Forhandlingsspill med kontrakt Selger: DS: Oppfyllelse Kjøper: DS: Forskutter __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

11.7 Forklaring av rettsregler - økonomisk teori om kontraktsrett Begrunnelser/forklaringer av kontraktsrettsregler Ønske om oppfyllelse av FK-forutsetninger Problemløsning når FK ikke er mulig eller ønskelig Ønske om å redusere transaksjonskostnader Kontraktsretten har som formål (iflg. teori i Cooter & Ulen): å stimulere til samarbeid mellom partene å skape optimal grad av oppfyllelse å skape optimal innrettelse å minimalisere forhandlingskostnader å skjerme 3. mannsinteresser Teorien kan oppsummeres slik: Kontraktsretten har som formål å bidra til at FK-forutsetningene blir oppfylt, korrigere markedssvikt og redusere transaksjonskostnadene (bidrar til effektivitet) Betydningen av en slik teori Interessant perspektiv om effektivitet skulle være et grunnleggende formål Fastere holdepunkt for å vurdere reelle hensyn Pedagogisk fordelaktig ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

12 Avtalevilkår i et marked Bestemmelse av primære avtalevilkår kan analyseres v.hj.a. markedsteori, herunder modell for fullkommen konkurranse Virkninger av sekundære avtalevilkår på pris og omsatt mengde kan analyseres v.hj.a. samme modell(er) Sekundære avtalevilkår påvirker partenes kostnader og betalingsvillighet, hvilket fører til ”skift” i tilbuds- og etterspørselskurver, og derved forflytninger av likevektsløsninger. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13 Erstatningsvernet ved kontraktsbrudd Hvilke kontraktsregler kan partene forventes å bli enige om? Hvilken erstatningsplikt kan partene forventes å bli enige om? Partene vil ønske å underlegge seg selv sanksjoner slik at den ideelle kontralt blir inngått og oppfylt 13.1 Oppfyllelse, brudd og sanksjoner En ideell kontrakt er fullstendig (spesifikasjoner for alle mulige situasjoner) effektiv (mest mulig til fordeling) Kontraktsretten bør bidra til at ideelle kontrakter blir inngått ”Kostnad av kontraktsbrudd” bør internaliseres 13.1.1 Spillteoretisk analyse Problemstillinger: Virkning av erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen på partenes adferd Blir resultatet av partenes adferd effektivt? Hvilken erstatningsregel bør partene velge om de ønsker mest mulig til fordeling? Erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen gir ”riktig” internalisering ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. 1. 1 Spillteoretisk analyse (forts. ) Tabell 13 13.1.1 Spillteoretisk analyse (forts.) Tabell 13.1 Forhandlingsspill om tilvirkning uten kontrakt som kan håndheves, med to mulige samarbeidskostnader Best for selger å bryte en eventuell kontrakt Dette vil kjøper forstå, og vil derfor ikke forskuddsbetale ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. 1. 1 Spillteoretisk analyse (forts. ) Tabell 13 13.1.1 Spillteoretisk analyse (forts.) Tabell 13.2 Forhandlingsspill med kontrakt og med to mulige oppfyllelseskostnader - Ved oppfyllelse blir utfallene som i tabell 13.1 - Hvis oppfyllelseskostnadene blir høye, vil selger bryte - Dominerende strategi for kjøper: Forskutter - Resultatet er Kaldor-Hicks-effektivt og Pareto-effektivt uansett faktiske oppfyllelseskostnader - En rasjonell aktør vil uten sanksjoner ikke forhåndsbetale (ingen kontrakt) - Betinget normativ konklusjon: Hvis partene ønsker Pareto-effektivitet, bør de avtale erstatning etter oppfyllelsesinteressen ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13.2 Innrettelse Innrettelse gir større utbytte ved oppfyllelse Innrettelse gir tap ved brudd (i mangel av erstatning) Skal vise: Erstatning etter perfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse gir Pareto-effektivitet 13.2.1 Løftemottagers rasjonelle valg (under usikkerhet) 13.2.1.1 Forventet gevinst og tap S = størrelse på en gevinst, et tap, etc. P = sannsynligheten for at S skal bli realisert PS = forventningsverdien Antar at løftemottager (og senere løftegiver) kun vurderer forventningsverdier 13.2.1.2 Innrettelse uten kontrakt (tabell 13.3) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. 2. 1. 2 Innrettelse uten kontrakt Tabell 13 13.2.1.2 Innrettelse uten kontrakt Tabell 13.3 Forhandlingsspill uten kontrakt og med to alternative innrettelseskostnader Øverste linje: lav innrettelse (kostnad = 0) Nederste linje: høy innrettelse(kostnad = 0,2) Best for selger ikke å samarbeide (DS) Best for kjøper med lav innrettelse (BR) ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Bestemmelse av den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse 13.2.1.3 Kontrakt som kan håndheves - Innrettelse avhenger av erstatning ved kontraktsbrudd Perfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse = oppfyllelsesinteressen for den innrettelse som gir et Kaldor-Hicks-effektivt resultat Imperfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse = oppfyllelsesinteressen for øvrige innrettleser Bestemmelse av den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse Spørsmål: Hvilken innrettelse er Kaldor-Hicks-effektiv (i tabell 13.3)? Svar: Ved lave samarbeidskostnader: Høy innrettelse og samarbeid Ved høye samarbeidskostnader: Lav innrettelse og ikke samarbeid Altså: Samarbeidskostnadene bestemmer om samarbeid er K-H-effektivt Ex ante (før beslutning): usikkert hva samarbeidskostnadene vil bli og dermed om selger vil samarbeide Anta at sannsynligheten for samarbeid (P) øker fra 0 til 1 K-H-effektivitet: Lav innrettelse for ”lav” P, høy innrettelse for ”høy” P ”Vippepunkt” for en bestemt verdi av P Forventet utfall for partene samlet ved lav innrettelse: P(1+2) + (1-P)(-4+4) = 3P Forventet utfall for partene samlet ved høy innrettlse: P(1,5+2) + (1-P)(-4,2+4) = 3,7P-0,2 Vippepunkt for P*, der P* bestemmes av 3P* = 3,7P* - 0,2 som gir P* = 2/7 Heretter: Antar P<2/7, dvs at lav innrettelse er K-H-effektivt. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13.2.1.4 Utfall ved kontraktsbrudd under perfekt og imperfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse (jfr. tabell 13.4) Lav innrettelse: Kjøpers utfallved kontraktsbrudd: 1; selgers utfall: -1 (for begge oppfyllelsesinteresser) Høy innrettelse: - Imperfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse, som inkl. negativ kontraktsinteresse (= 0,2): - - Kjøpers utfall: 1,7-0,2 = 1,5 ; Selgers utfall: -1,7 - Perfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse, som ikke inkl. negativ kontraktsinteresse (ikke K-H-eff) - Kjøpers utfall: 1-0,2 = 0,8; Selgers utfall: -1 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13.2.1.5 Aktørenes valg (i) Erstatning etter den imperfekte oppfyllelsesinteressen: Kjøper velger høy innrettelse (ikke K-H-effektivt) (ii) Erstatning etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteressen: Lav innrettelse best ved brudd (utfall = 1 > 0,8) Høy innrettelse best ved oppfyllelse (utfall = 1,5 > 1) Anta hypotetisk at sannsynligheten for oppfyllelse (P) øker fra 0 til 1 Kjøper vil velge lav innrettelse når P er ”lav” Kjøper vil velge høy innrettelse når P er ”høy” Vippepunktet: Kjøpers forventede utfall ved lav innrettelse: P(1) + (1-P)(1) = 1 Kjøpers forventede utfall ved høy innrettelse: P(1,5) + (1-P)(0,8) = 0,7P + 0,8 Vippepunkt for P*, der P* bestemmes av 1 = 0,7P* + 0,8, som gir P* = 2/7 Antok at P<2/7, og at kjøper vet dette. Kjøper vil i egeninteresse velge lav innrettelse (hvilket er best også for ”samfunnet” Konklusjon: Hvis det gis erstatning etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse, vil kjøper innrette seg slik at resultatet bli K-H-effektivt. Hvis det gis erstatning etter den imperfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse, vil innrettelsen bli for høy til å gi et K_H-effektivt resultat ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13.2.2 Betinget normativ analyse Den (vitenskapsteoretisk) positive analyse viser at erstatning etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse gir et K-H-effektivt resultat Hvis man ønsker et K-H-effektivt resultat, er erstatning etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteresse en mulig sanksjonsregel Hvorfor erstatning etter perfekt oppfyllelsesinteresse? Hvis løftegiver må erstatte all innrettelse, vil løftemottager øke innrettelsen så lenge dette gir et stadig bedre utfall ved oppfyllelse Intet å tape på brudd For høy innrettelse Konklusjon: Hvis partene ønsker innrettelse som innebærer Kaldor-Hicks-effektivitet (ved kontraktsoppfyllelse eller brudd), bør brudd erstattes etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteressen. Innrettelsen blir for høy hvis alle innrettelseskostnader erstattes Hvis kontraktsretten skal ha som formål å bidra til Kaldor-Hicks-effektiv utnyttelse av samfunnet ressurser, bør det ved kontraktsbrudd betales erstatning etter den perfekte oppfyllelsesinteressen. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________