Internasjonale menneskerettigheter, 2. avd. Kildebruk og metode Stipendiat Tone Wærstad, t.l.warstad@jus.uio.no

INTERNASJONALE MENNESKERETTIGHETER, 2. AVDELING VÅR 2008 FORBEREDELSER TIL KURS. Forberedelser til første samling Hovedtema: Kilder og metode. Forberedelser: Les EMDs avgjørelse i saken Tyrer mot Storbritannia fra 1978, særlig avsnitt 9-22 (sakens faktum) og avsnitt 28-35 (domstolens vurderinger vedrørende EMK art. 3). Hvilke rettskilder bruker domstolen? Hvordan går domstolen frem for å vurdere sakens materielle spørsmål? Forberedelser til andre samling Hovedtema: Inngrepshjemler og positive forpliktelser. Forberedelser: Les EMDs avgjørelse i saken Leyla Şahin mot Tyrkia fra 2005, særlig avsnitt 14-28 (sakens faktum) og avsnitt 70-123 (partenes anførsler og EMDs vurderinger av EMK artikkel 9). Les også EMDs avgjørelse i saken Appleby med flere mot Storbritannia fra 2003, særlig avsnitt 10-21 (sakens faktum) og avsnitt 39-50 (EMDs vurderinger av EMK artikkel 10). Hvordan går domstolen frem for å avgjøre om myndighetsinngrep i en persons religionsfrihet innebærer en krenkelse av konvensjonen? Hvordan går domstolen frem når den skal avgjøre rekkevidden av myndighetenes handlingsrom hvis spørsmålet den tar stilling til er omfanget av handlingsplikter (positive plikter) og ikke negative plikter? Forberedelser til tredje samling Hovedtema: Diskrimineringsforbudet i EMK. Forberedelser: Les EMDs avgjørelse i saken Thlimmenos mot Hellas fra 2000, særlig avsnitt 7-13 (sakens faktum) og avsnitt 33-49 (partenes anførsler og domstolens vurderinger vedrørende EMK art. 14). Hvordan går domstolen frem for å avgjøre om forskjellsbehandling er i strid med konvensjonen? Og hvordan går den frem for å avgjøre om likebehandling er konvensjonsstridig?

Lov om styrking av menneskerettighetenes stilling i norsk rett (menneskerettsloven). LOV-1999-05-21-30 §3. Bestemmelsene i konvensjoner og protokoller som er nevnt i §2 skal ved motstrid gå foran bestemmelser i annen lovgivning. 1

Lov om styrking av menneskerettighetenes stilling i norsk rett (menneskerettsloven). LOV-1999-05-21-30 §2. Følgende konvensjoner skal gjelde som norsk lov i den utstrekning de er bindende for Norge: 1.Europarådets konvensjon 4. november 1950 om beskyttelse av menneskerettighetene og de grunnleggende friheter som endret ved ellevte protokoll 11. mai 1994, med følgende tilleggsprotokoller: a)Protokoll 20. mars 1952, b)Fjerde protokoll 16. september 1963 om beskyttelse av visse rettigheter og friheter som ikke allerede omfattes av konvensjonen og av første tilleggsprotokoll til konvensjonen, c)Sjette protokoll 28. april 1983 om opphevelse av dødsstraff, d)Syvende protokoll 22. november 1984, e.Trettende protokoll 21. februar 2002 om avskaffelse av dødsstraff under enhver omstendighet, 2.De forente nasjoners internasjonale konvensjon 16. desember 1966 om økonomiske, sosiale og kulturelle rettigheter, 3.De forente nasjoners internasjonale konvensjon 16. desember 1966 om sivile og politiske rettigheter med følgende tilleggsprotokoller: a)Valgfri protokoll 16. desember 1966, b)Annen valgfri protokoll 15. desember 1989 om avskaffelse av dødsstraff. 4.De forente nasjoners internasjonale konvensjon 20. november 1989 om barnets rettigheter med følgende tilleggsprotokoller: a)Valgfri protokoll 25. mai 2000 om salg av barn, barneprostitusjon og barnepornografi, b)Valgfri protokoll 25. mai 2000 om barn i væpnet konflikt 0Endret ved lover 1 aug 2003 nr. 86 (i kraft 1 okt 2003 iflg. res. 1 aug 2003 nr. 991), 10 juni 2005 nr. 49 (i kraft 1 des 2005 iflg. res. 2 sep 2005 nr. 965). Endres ytterligere ved lov 10 juni 2005 nr. 49 (i kraft fra den tid fjortende protokoll til EMK trer i kraft, jfr. lov 18 juni 2005 nr. 49, II).

Rt. 2005 side 833, avsnitt 45. (45) Men før jeg går inn på dette, og på vurderingen av forholdet til uskyldspresumsjonen i den foreliggende sak, viser jeg til de grunnleggende tolkingsprinsipper for anvendelsen av forrangsbestemmelsen i menneskerettsloven §3 som er trukket opp av Høyesterett i plenumsdommen i Rt-2000-996, og senere flere ganger gjentatt, jf. plenumsdommene i Rt-2002-557 og Rt-2003-359. Det følger av disse at ved anvendelse av reglene i EMK skal norske domstoler foreta en selvstendig tolking av konvensjonen. Herunder skal de benytte samme metode som EMD. Norske domstoler må således forholde seg til konvensjonsteksten, alminnelige formålsbetraktninger og EMDs avgjørelser. Det er likevel i første rekke EMD som skal utvikle konvensjonen. Og dersom det er tvil om forståelsen, må norske domstoler ved avveiningen av ulike interesser eller verdier kunne trekke inn verdiprioriteringer som ligger til grunn for norsk lovgivning og rettsoppfatning.

Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, 23.5. 1969, art. 31-33 SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES Article 31 General rule of interpretation 1.A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2.The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 13 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4.A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, 23.5. 1969, art. 31-33 Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, 23.5. 1969, art. 31-33 Article 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages 1.When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail. 2.A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree. 3.The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 4.Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.

Bancovic and others v Belgium etc 2001 (a)  The applicable rules of interpretation 55.  The Court recalls that the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention 1969 (Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, § 29). 56.  It will, therefore, seek to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase “within their jurisdiction” in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention (Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention 1969 and, amongst other authorities, Johnston and Others v. Ireland judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, § 51). The Court will also consider “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” (Article 31 § 3 (b) of the Vienna Convention 1969 and the above-cited Loizidou judgment (preliminary objections), at § 73).

Bancovic and others v Belgium etc 2001 57.  Moreover, Article 31 § 3 (c) indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. More generally, the Court recalls that the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Court must also take into account any relevant rules of international law when examining questions concerning its jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State responsibility in conformity with the governing principles of international law, although it must remain mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty (the above-cited Loizidou judgment (merits), at §§ 43 and 52). The Convention should be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which it forms part (Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, [GC], no. 35763, § 60, to be reported in ECHR 2001).

Bancovic and others v Belgium etc 2001 58.  It is further recalled that the travaux préparatoires can also be consulted with a view to confirming any meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 1969 or to determining the meaning when the interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 1969 leaves the meaning “ambiguous or obscure” or leads to a result which is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” (Article 32). The Court has also noted the ILC commentary on the relationship between the rules of interpretation codified in those Articles 31 and 32 (the text of those Articles and a summary of the ILC commentary is set out above at §§ 16-18 above).

Christine Goodwin v UK para. 74 74.  While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases (see, for example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001-I, § 70). However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved (see, amongst other authorities, the Cossey judgment, p. 14, § 35, and Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, judgment of 28 May 2002, to be published in ECHR 2002-, §§ 67-68). It is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement (see the above-cited Stafford v. the United Kingdom judgment, § 68). In the present context the Court has, on several occasions since 1986, signalled its consciousness of the serious problems facing transsexuals and stressed the importance of keeping the need for appropriate legal measures in this area under review (see the Rees judgment, § 47; the Cossey judgment, § 42; the Sheffield and Horsham judgment, § 60).

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 Article 38 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.

Tyrer v the United Kingdom 1978 EMK art. 3 Art 3. Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.