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Dag 4: Statsansvar og tvisteløsning Skillet mellom ”primærregler” og ”sekundærregler” Reglene om statsansvar gjelder når primærreglene om statenes forpliktelser.

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Presentasjon om: "Dag 4: Statsansvar og tvisteløsning Skillet mellom ”primærregler” og ”sekundærregler” Reglene om statsansvar gjelder når primærreglene om statenes forpliktelser."— Utskrift av presentasjonen:

1 Dag 4: Statsansvar og tvisteløsning Skillet mellom ”primærregler” og ”sekundærregler” Reglene om statsansvar gjelder når primærreglene om statenes forpliktelser er brutt Når foreligger et folkerettsbrudd; hvilke konsekvenser får det?

2 ILCs rolle –Siden 1920-tallet. På dagsorden siden 1949; påbegynte arbeidet i 1956; utkast i 2001 –Videre skjebne er åpen, anbefalt traktatkonferanse

3 ILC-utkastet Art. 1: Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State

4 Hva menes med en ”internationally wrongful act of a State”? Handlingen må være ”wrongful” Handlingen må kunne tilordnes staten

5 Art. 2: Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State There in an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an act or ommission: (a)Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b)Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State

6 Hvilke regler er relevante? Folkeretten? Nasjonal rett?

7 Article 3: Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.

8 Når foreligger et folkerettsbrudd? Brudd på folkerettslig forpliktelse Forpliktelsen må være bindende for den aktuelle staten

9 Article 12: Existence of a breach of an international obligation There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.

10 Article 13: International obligation in force for a State An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.

11 Kreves noe mer enn objektivt folkerettsbrudd? Kreves skyld? To skoler: –objektivt ansvar –skyldansvar

12 Flertallet innenfor reelle saker og rettsteori forfekter den objektive teorien I Korfu kanal-saken (1949) kom ICJ med uttalelser som kunne tyde på en skyld- teori: –”it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a state over its territory and waters that the state necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein …”

13 Men: i Korfu kanal-saken understreket ICJ samtidig at det forhold at handlingene hadde funnet sted på en annen stats (Albanias) territorium hadde betydning for hva som kunne kreves av beviser fra offerstatens side. ILCs kommentar understreker at utkastet ikke tar stilling til spørsmålet om objektivt ansvar eller skyldansvar, og at vurderingen vil kunne variere fra sak til sak, avhengig av folkerettsbruddets karakter.

14 Når kan en handling tilordnes staten? (Imputability) Staten kan bare handle gjennom personer Staten kan ikke være ansvarlig for alle statsborgernes handlinger Objektivt statsansvar for enhver handling utført av en statsrepresentant ville vært et incitament for staten til å ha god kontroll Men ingen rimelig regel; umulig for stater å kontrollere

15 I Korfu kanal-saken (ICJ, 1949) ble Albania hold ansvarlig for minelegging I havet til tross for at det ikke var på det rene hvem som hadde lagt minene. I Rainbow Warrior-saken (UNSG, 1986) ble Frankrike holdt ansvarlige for franske agenters virksomhet I New Zealand Eichmann i Argentina (ikke reist sak…)

16 Kreves en kopling mellom staten og personen som faktisk begikk handlingen eller unnlatelsen

17 Attribution of conduct to a State Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State 1.The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2.An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.

18 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur (ICJ, 1999): ”According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a state must be regarded as an act of that state”

19 Hva med private enheter som utøver myndighet som ellers tilligger staten? Eks. privat selskap som fungerer som driver et fengsel i Irak Outsoursing of war – en pulverisering av ansvar? Kan staten holdes ansvarlig for deres handlinger?

20 Article 5: Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.

21 Hva om vedkommende handler som myndighetsperson, men handlingen: –ligger utenfor vedkommende persons kompetanse? –går i mot instrukser?

22 Caire-saken (UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1929): ”[The state officials] have acted at least to all appearances as competent officials or organs or they must have used powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity.”

23 Mossé-saken (UNRIAA, 1953): ”acts performed by officials within teh apparent limits of their functions, in accordance with a line of conduct which was not entirely contrary to the instructions received” Sml. sondringen mellom private handlinger og offisielle statshandlinger mht. individuell strafferettslig immunitet...

24 Sandline-saken (International Law Reports): ”... even if [the officials] act ultra vires or unlawful under the internal law of the state... when they purport to act in their capacity as organs of the state”. (Et ”objektivt” ansvar; avgrenses bare mot private handlinger. Sml. sondringen for strafferettslig immunitet.)

25 Article 7: Excess of authority or contravention of instructions The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.

26 Kan staten holdes ansvarlig for andre aktørers handlinger med den begrunnelse at staten har en viss autoritet over eller øver en viss kontroll med handlingen?

27 Article 8: Conduct directed or controlled by a State The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.

28 Vilkåret om ”instructions” er uomtvisted, mens vilkåret ”direction or control” er mer kontroversielt. Hva kreves her? ILCs kommentar: ”Such conduct will be attributable to the state only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of the operation”.

29 Nicaragua-saken (ILC, 1986): For at aktivitetene til Contras-geriljaen skulle kunne tilordnes USA, ”it would in principle have to be proved that that state had effective control over the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which teh alleged violations were committeed”. - Generell ”overall”-kontroll ikke tilstrekkelig.

30 Hva med ansvar for statlige investeringer i private selskaper som begår f.eks. menneskerettighetskrenkelser? Sml. Etikkrådet for oljefondets investeringer og deres ”anbefalinger” Artikkel 8 om ”kontroll” antakelig avgjørende

31 ”Stedfortredende” statshandlinger Kan staten holdes ansvarlig?

32 Article 9: Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority.

33 Hva med ”rebel-handlinger”? Faller utenfor statsansvaret når staten har vært i god tro og ikke utvist uaktsomhet Hvis staten siden godkjenner og identifiserer seg med handlingen, kan staten holdes ansvarlig

34 Gisselsaken i Teheran i 1979: –Gisseltakingen ble i utgangspunktet utført av en militant gruppe som ikke kunne identifiseres med den iranske stat –Gisseltakingen ble siden godkjent av Ayatollah Khomeini –Iran unnlot å gripe inn –Den militante gruppen ble dermed en iransk ”state agent”

35 Ansvarsfritaksgrunner: –samtykke –selvforsvar –represalier –force majeure –nødrett

36 Article 20: Consent – eks. En stat sender væpnede styrker inn i en annen stat på sistnevntes anmodning Article 21: Self-defence - i samsvar med FN-pakten

37 ICJ i Atomvåpen-saken (1996)- om nødverge: ”Respect for the environment is one of teh elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.”

38 Article 22: Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act –“Reprisals” som ikke involverer maktbruk

39 –Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997): “[Firstly it] must be taken in response of a previous international wrongful act of another state and must be directed against that state … Secondly, the injured state must have called upon the [other state] to discontinue its wrongful conduct or make reparation … effects [to] induce the wrongdoing state comply with its obligations … and the measure must therefore be reveisible.”

40 Article 23: Force majeure –I Rainbow Warrior-saken hadde Frankrike latt en av agentene flytte tilbake til Frankrike uten New Zealands samtykke. Hevdet at det var nødvendig pga. sykdom. Det krevdes likevel “absolute and material impossibility” og det at forpliktelsen ble vanskeligere og mer byrdefull utgjorde ingen force majeure.

41 Article 25: Necessity a) only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.

42 Article 26: Compliance with peremptory norms Nothing in this Chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.

43 Rettsvirkninger av ansvar Plikt til opphør og garanti mot gjentakelse (art. 30) – sml. Rainbow Warrior hvor repatrieringen ikke representerte noe fortsatt brudd og hvor forpliktelsen ikke lenger bestod...

44 Article 30- Cessation and non-repetition The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a)To cease that act, if it is continuing; (b)To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.

45 Reparasjon av skade (art. 34) –Gjenetablere situasjonen forut for handlingen –Erstatning (”compensation) –Oppreisning (”satisfaction”)

46 Chorzow Factory-saken (PCIJ, 1928): ”The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act is that reperation must [...] wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.

47 Article 31- Reparation 1.The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 2.Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.

48 Article 34- Forms of reparation Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

49 Article 35- Restitution A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution: (a)Is not materially impossible; (b)Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation.

50 Article 36 – Compensation 1.The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2.The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.

51 Article 37- Satisfaction 1.The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2.Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 3.Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State.

52 Brudd på jus cogens normer –Var foreslått at stater skulle kunne holdes strafferettslig ansvarlige –Vist til utviklingen av jus cogens; utviklingen av individuelt straffeansvar etter folkeretten; og FN-paktens mulighet for autorisering av maktbruk mot stater –Likevel oppgitt pga. kontroversialiteten

53 I stedet: Article 40 - Application of this Chapter 1.This Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 2.A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.

54 Article 41- Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this Chapter States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 3.This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a breach to which this Chapter applies may entail under international law.

55 Rettshåndhevelse I Statssuverenitet som grunnleggende problem –Mangler tvangsmiddel –Er et rettssystem uten tvangsmiddel ”tomt”? Konsensus som grl. forutsetin

56 Ulike grunner til folkerettsbrudd –Manglende evne eller vilje til å oppfylle –Uklare forpliktelser Mekanismer for å sikre rettshåndhevelse –”Myke” mekanismer –Positive: teknisk/finansiell støtte – evne –Negative: ulike typer sanksjoner –Forhandlinger –Eksponering av folkerettsbrudd

57 Løsning av interessekonflikter Avklaring av rettstilstanden Avklaring av om folkerettsbrudd foreligger Grunnlag for håndhevningstiltak? Fordeling av ansvar Forebygging av folkerettsbrudd

58 Former for tvisteløsning Forhandlinger mellom partene Nøytral tredjepart deltar Tvisten overlates til int. institusjoner Voldgift Domstol

59 FN-paktens art. 2(3): All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

60 Pacific Settlement of Disputes Article The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

61 Article 34 The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

62 Article Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

63 Article The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

64 Article Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

65 Article 38 Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

66 Oversikt over mekanismer Globale – FN –ICJ, ITLOS. ICC, Permanent Court of Arbitration, ILO Commissions, World Bank Inspection Panel Globale utenfor FN –WTO, ICSID Regionale/bilaterale –ECJ, EFTA Court, NAFTA, EMD, andre frihandels- og MR-domstoler

67 –Iran-US Claims Tribunal, UN Compensation Commission, ICTY og ICTY Andre gjennomføringsmekanismer –UN Human Rights Committee, CERD Committee m.m.

68 Fremtidsutsikter Økt fragmentering? Gravitasjon mot noen sterke systemer? Styrking av ikke-statlige aktørers roller? –Initiering av prosessen –Deltakelse i prosessen –Gjenstand for prosessen Økende bruk?

69 Haag-domstolen: ICJ Effektiv eller irrelevant? Jurisdiksjonsspørsmål Politisk rolle? Tvistesaker vs. rådgivende rolle

70 Art. 1: The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

71 Article Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. [...]

72 Article The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

73 Article The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

74 Article 59 The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. Article 60 The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.


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